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THE PROBLEM WITH "MONEY NOW,
TERMS LATER": PROCD, INC. V.
ZEIDENBERG AND THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF "SHRINKWRAP"
SOFTWARE LICENSES
Hope springs eternal in the commercial world and expectations
are usually, but not always, realized
I. INTRODUCTION
You are an ordinary consumer looking to buy a piece of software
for your new computer. You go to a software retailer hoping to find
a computer program that will help you organize the finances of your
home business. Once in the store, you become bewildered by the
number of programs available for this purpose. You scan the shelves
for one that will solve your company's financial woes. Finally, some-
thing catches your eye. You pull a box of software from the shelf to
take a closer look. The title of the software, "Finance Made Easy," is
on the front in large bold letters. The information on the box details
what the software will do for you, and the pictures on the box show
what the screens will look like on your computer. Satisfied that you
have found just what you need, you take the software to the counter
and purchase it.
When you get home, you can hardly wait to use the program,
which promises to end your troubles forever. Like a child on Christ-
mas morning, you tear open the cellophane that seals the package.
You open the box, find the CD-ROM on which the program is
stored, and load it onto your computer. You do this so fast that you
don't even notice the "user guide" packaged inside the box with the
software. It is not until sometime later, after you have already begun
to use the software, that you notice it. When you finally read it, you
see the following opening paragraph:
Please read this license carefully before using the software
or accessing the listings contained on the discs. By using the
1. McJunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, Inc., 888 F.2d 481,482 (6th Cir. 1989).
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discs and the listings licensed to you, you agree to be bound
by the terms of this License. If you do not agree to the
terms of this License, promptly return all copies of the soft-
ware, listings that may have been exported, the discs and the
User Guide to the place where you obtained it.2
Upon further review of the license, you are shocked to learn that the
license limits use of the software to "individual or personal use" and
prohibits any commercial or business use Unfortunately, this means
that you cannot use the software for your business.
This restriction presents a dilemma for you. You bought the
software to improve the finances of your business. Certainly, you
would not have purchased it had you been aware of the restriction.
Now, you have the software at home, you have already opened the
box, and you have even begun to use your new product. Although
the license says that you can return the software to the store where
you purchased it,4 the store is over fifty miles away.5 It does not seem
fair that you should bear the burden of returning the software, con-
sidering that you were not apprised of this significant restriction be-
fore you purchased it. After pondering the apparent unfairness of
the transaction, you begin to wonder: "Is something like this en-
forceable?"6
According to the court in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, this
"shrinkwrap license"8 is enforceable against you, the buyer, even if
2. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev'd,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). This is the actual language found in ProCD's li-
cense. See id.
3. Id. at 645.
4. Actually, retailers typically will not give a refund on computer software if
the shrinkwrap on the box has been opened. See TARGET STORES, COMPUTER
SOFrwARE RETURN POLICY 12-105642 (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review). Target's policy provides that a refund will only be granted if the soft-
ware is "unopened and factory-sealed." Id. The policy further provides that
"[o]pened... [software] will be exchanged for the identical item." Id. As a re-
sult, purchasers who are unhappy with the terms of a license may be required to
return the software directly to the manufacturer.
5. This is more likely to be a problem for those living in rural areas than for
those living in urban areas. Still, both urban and rural purchasers may have to
drive a considerable distance for hard-to-find software.
6. This type of reaction to a software vendor's purported power is not un-
common. See Terence P. Maher & Margaret L. Milroy, Licensing in a New Age:
Contracts, Computers and the UCC, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 22, 22
("Could this happen?").
7. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
8. Computer software is usually sealed in plastic under a process known as
"shrinkwrapping." See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
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you were not aware of the terms at the time you purchased the soft-
ware.9 In overturning the district court's decision, Judge Easter-
brook, writing for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
stated that "[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms
are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for
example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are uncon-
scionable)."'0
Judge Easterbrook made no secret of his laissez-faire approach
to shrinkwrap licenses. He stated that "[c]ompetition among ven-
dors, not judicial revision of a package's contents, is how consumers
are protected in a market economy."'" In other words, the software
vendors who provide the most attractive terms will sell more software
than their counterparts who offer less attractive terms. As a result,
those with less attractive terms will be forced to provide more favor-
able terms in order to compete in the market." The beneficiaries of
this market competition are the consumers who ostensibly will enjoy
lower prices and better license terms. For Judge Easterbrook, this
justified the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses, regardless of
whether the individual" consumer knew about the terms at the time
of purchase.
While lower prices and more favorable license terms for soft-
ware consumers are laudable goals, they do not justify the disregard
of established contract law; moreover, they should not come at the
expense of the individual consumer who may be surprised-and
harmed-by the hidden terms of a shrinkwrap license. The holding
in ProCD, however, produces this inequitable result. Not only is it
wholly inconsistent with the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
but also it places an unfair and unnecessary hardship on software
consumers.
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1241 (1995). From this, the term "shrinkwrap
license" was born.
9. See ProCd, 86 F.3d at 1449.
10. l
11. Id. at 1453 (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Tech., Inc., 73 F.3d
756 (7th Cir. 1996)).
12. Judge Easterbrook noted that "ProCD has rivals, which may elect to
compete by offering superior software, monthly updates, improved terms of use,
lower price, or a better compromise among these elements." Idt
13. In ProCD, Judge Easterbrook drew a distinction between the
"individual" consumer and the "collective" consumer. Cf id. He wrote that"adjusting terms in [the] buyers' favor might help [the individual plaintiff] today
(he already has the software) but would lead to a response, such as a higher
price, that might make consumers as a whole worse off." Id.
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Part II of this Note provides a history of shrinkwrap licenses, and
discusses judicial treatment of shrinkwrap licenses prior to that in
ProCD. Part III examines the background of ProCD and the basis
for the decision. Part IV criticizes the decision in light of the UCC
and the hardship that the decision places on software consumers.
Part V proposes a solution that will make the use of shrinkwrap li-
censes consistent with the UCC, reduce the hardship placed on con-
sumers, and preserve Judge Easterbrook's goal of transactional effi-
ciency. Part VI concludes that "money now, terms later" not only is
unfair and inconsistent with established legal principles but also is
unnecessary in light of available alternatives.
II. BACKGROUND OF SHRINKWRAP LICENSES
A. A Historical Perspective
Shrinkwrap licenses have been an integral part of software
transactions.14 It is not known, however, when they were first used or
who first used them.Y Despite these questions, it is clear that their
increased usage paralleled the software industry's movement from
primarily customized software packages and agreements to a mass
market mode of software delivery.16
In the early days of computer history, the only computers that
existed were large mainframes. These computers could cost hun-
dreds of thousands or even millions of dollars; consequently, they
were available only to a select group of consumers who could afford
them." In addition, most software during this period was customized
for these mainframe computers and carried an equally steep price
tag. 9 Lawyers drafted the contracts for these software sales transac-
tions, and their clients usually were large corporations for whom
14. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1241.
15. See id. at 1241 n.5 ("Exactly who first used a shrinkwrap license provision
in a software transaction is a fact lost in the arcane mists of computer history.
Certainly, they were a feature of the licensing landscape by the early 1980s.").
16. See Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the Shrinkwrap License, 23
COLO. LAw. 1321, 1321 (1994) ("Ever since the development of mass market
computer software, companies have relied on the 'shrinkwrap license' for pro-
tection of their intellectual property rights.").
17. See 2 DAvID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 4A.02[4], at 4A-141 (1996).
18. See id.
19. See id. A typical software package cost tens of thousands of dollars. See
[Vol. 31:325
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"contracts and lawyers were a way of life."'
As computer technology advanced, personal computers replaced
the large mainframe computers.2' Personal computers, unlike their
expensive mainframe predecessors, were relatively inexpensive" and
soon became a mass market item.' For software companies, the pro-
liferation of personal computers was a "bonanza" and marked the
birth of mass market software.24
Though the advent of mass market software was an overall boon
to software developers, it presented a problem absent from the cus-
tomized software transactions that dominated the early days of soft-
ware development. Customized software transactions generally in-
volved sophisticated parties, each of whom generally had lawyers do
their contracting. In contrast, the mass market transaction, by defi-
nition, did not allow such an arrangement.2' Software developers
needed to find a way to create a contractually binding agreement
with the user without impeding the flow of their product into the
stream of commerce. The software industry's solution to this prob-
lem was the shrinkwrap license.
Today, shrinkwrap licenses are included, in some form or an-
other, with nearly every piece of software sold.2 However, there is
little uniformity among shrinkwrap licenses. For instance, some li-
censes are one page documents, while others are more expansive
booklets.2 In addition, software developers place the licenses in
20. IL
21. See id.
22. "Today, most computers in existence cost less than $10,000, and many
cost less than $2,000." Id.
23. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz & Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of
Mass Market Software License Agreements, 22 RuTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 335, 339 (1996). Since the advent of the personal computer, sales have
mushroomed, with some models enjoying sales in the millions. See 2 BENDER,
supra note 17, § 4A.02[4], at 4A-141.
24. 2 BENDER, supra note 17, § 4A.02[4], at 4A-141.
25. "In the case of mass market software, usually distributed for use with
high-volume hardware like personal computers (PCs), licensors cannot practi-
cally incur the huge transaction costs that would be involved if they attempted to
negotiate with every licensee." Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary
Between Copyright and Contract Copyright Preemption of Software License
Terms, 45 DuKE L.J. 479, 495 (1995).
26. "Virtually no major mass-marketed software program is distributed today
without a 'shrinkwrap' . . . license." Carey R. Ramos & Joseph P. Verdon,
Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses After ProCD v. Zeidenberg, COMPUTER
LAW., Sept. 1996, at 1, 1.
27. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1241. "The prototypical example is a single
piece of paper .... Other examples of the genre include licenses printed on the
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various locations within the software packaging.2 Finally, software
creators include a wide variety of contractual terms in their licenses,
namely terms involving proprietary rights, limitation of warranties,
and limitations on use of the software.
B. Prior Adjudication of Shrinkwrap License Enforceability
It is surprising that shrinkwrap licenses had seen little action in
the courts prior to the decision in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg." Even
Judge Easterbrook commented that "businesses seem to feel less un-
certainty [about shrinkwrap licenses] than do scholars."31  Before
ProCD, two cases comprised the body of law on the contractual en-
forceability of shrinkwrap licenses: Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v.
Wyse Technologyu and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link,
Inc.
33
In Step-Saver the court considered the enforceability of a
shrinkwrap license in the context of a software transaction that oc-
outside of boxes containing software, licenses simply included somewhere within
the box, or licenses shrinkwrapped with the owner's manual accompanying the
software." Id.
28. See 2 MICHAEL D. ScoTr, ScoTr ON COMPUTER LAW § 12.08[D], at 12-
17 to 12-18 (2d ed. 1996). The following practices are common: (1) putting the
license on an envelope inside the package which contains the software diskettes;
(2) programming the software so that the computer screen displays the terms of
the license before the user can access the software; and (3) placing the license on
the outside of the package but underneath the shrinkwrap so that it is visible to
the user prior to purchase. See id. Note that the problem addressed in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), is not an issue when the license
terms are visible through the plastic wrap because the user has an opportunity to
review the terms prior to making the purchase.
29. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1242-48. With regard to proprietary rights, a
question often "arises as to why the program developer does not simply rely on
copyright. The answer is that many developers perceive problems with placing
reliance solely on copyright. For example: the vendor may wish to limit use to a
particular [computer] terminal; copyright alone will not do that." 2 BENDER, su-
pra note 17, § 4A.02[4], at 4A-142. "Shrinkwrap licenses are also important in
protecting the elements of software products that are not protected by copyright
law against widespread copying." Ramos & Verdon, supra note 26, at 2. For
more on the relationship between contract and copyright, see generally
O'Rourke, supra note 25 (discussing the relationship between contract and
copyright in the context of software licensing).
30. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). "Despite the widespread use of such li-
censes, there has been a surprising paucity of court decisions addressing their en-
forceability." Ramos & Verdon, supra note 26, at 1.
31. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. Judge Easterbrook referred to scholars having
more uncertainty about the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses than businesses
because of the "flux of law review articles discussing shrinkwrap licenses." Id.
32. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
33. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
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curred over the phone.' The license, which was printed on each box
of software that was sent to the buyer, purported to disclaim all war-
ranties provided under the UCC?5 The buyer, Step-Saver Data Sys-
tems, Inc. ("Step-Saver"), contacted the seller, The Software Link
("TSL"), to purchase the software.6 The purchases took place in the
following manner:
First, Step-Saver would telephone TSL and place an order.
(Step-Saver would typically order twenty copies of the pro-
gram at a time.) TSL would accept the order and promise,
while on the telephone, to ship the goods promptly. After
the telephone order, Step-Saver would send a purchase or-
der, detailing the items to be purchased, their price, and
shipping and payment terms. TSL would ship the order
promptly, along with an invoice. The invoice would contain
terms essentially identical with those on Step-Saver's pur-
chase order: price, quantity, and shipping and payment
terms. No reference was made during the telephone calls,
or on either the purchase orders or the invoices with regard
to a disclaimer of any warranties.'
When the software failed, Step-Saver sued TSL for breach of war-
ranty.3 TSL argued that its license had effectively disclaimed all war-
ranties 9 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, did
not agree. 40
In its opinion, which was delivered by Judge Wisdom, the court
determined that a contract had formed before Step-Saver had an op-
portunity to read the license.41 According to the court, the dispute
was "not over the existence of a contract, but the nature of its
terms., 42 To determine which terms were part of the agreement, the
court turned to section 2-207 of the UCC.43
34. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 95-98.
35. See id. at 94-95.
36. See id. at 95-96.
37. Il
38. See icL at 94.
39. See id. at 94-95.
40. See id at 105.
41. See id. at 98. "We see no need to parse the parties's [sic] various actions
to decide exactly when the parties formed a contract. TSL has shipped the prod-
uct, and Step-Saver has accepted and paid for each copy of the program." Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 98-106.
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Section 2-207, which governs situations where an acceptance of
an offer contains additional terms such as warranty disclaimers, pro-
vides that
[a] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon,
unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms.
Section 2-207 further provides that when both parties are mer-
chants,45 the additional terms become part of the contract only if they
do not materially alter it.4
With little trouble, the court found that the license's disclaimer
of warranties provision materially altered the contract between Step-
Saver and TSL.47 Relying on this finding, the court determined that
this term was not part of the contract.4
Two years later another court addressed the contractual en-
forceability of shrinkwrap licenses in Arizona Retail.49 In that case,
the buyer, Arizona Retail Systems ("ARS"), purchased software
from TSL.-° The court found that the parties had actually formed
several contracts over a period of time and analyzed the initial pur-
chase and subsequent purchases of the software separately."
For the initial purchase, the court found that ARS had ordered
an "evaluation diskette" so that it could first test the software
44. U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995).
45. A merchant is "a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction." Id § 2-104(1).
46. See id. § 2-207(2)(b) (providing that, between merchants, additional terms
in an acceptance will become part of a contract unless the terms materially alter
the contract). The official comment to section 2-207 sets forth that "typical
clauses which would normally 'materially alter' the contract and so result in sur-
prise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party
are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of merchantability or fit-
ness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty normally
attaches." Id. § 2-207 cmt. 4.
47. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105 ("[W]e must conclude that adding the dis-
claimer of warranty and limitation of remedies provisions from the box-top li-
cense would, as a matter of law, substantially alter the distribution of risk be-
tween Step-Saver and TSL.").
4& See id
49. See Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 761.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 763.
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product.' A "live copy" of the software, which was sealed in an enve-
lope, came with this diskette.' A printed message on the envelope
stated that "by opening the envelope the user acknowledges
'acceptance of this product, and [consents] to all the provisions [of]
the Limited Use License Agreement."'" The court concluded that
TSL made an offer by including the live copy of the software along
with the evaluation diskette; furthermore, the court found that ARS
accepted the offer by opening the sealed envelope that contained the
software." In finding that the terms of the shrinkwrap license were
part of the contract between the parties, the court explained that its
decision was "not inconsistent with Step-Saver" because ARS, the
buyer, had an opportunity to read the terms before a contract was
formed.56
The court, however, reached a different conclusion with respect
to the subsequent purchases. Unlike the initial purchase, the court
determined that a contract had been formed before ARS had an op-
portunity to read the terms of the license.' The court outlined in de-
tail the usual business procedure between ARS and TSL:
ARS typically contacted TSL and ordered copies of PC-
MOS over the telephone. During the order calls, the parties
agreed on the specific goods to be shipped, the quantity of
goods, and the price for the goods. TSL would accept the
orders and promise to ship them promptly, and thereafter
would ship the goods together with invoices. Although the
parties apparently never discussed the license agreement,
each copy of PC-MOS would have the license agreement at-
tached to its packaging."
Noting that the circumstances surrounding the subsequent purchases
were very similar to those in Step-Saver, the court addressed TSL's
three arguments as to why its license was part of the agreement be-
tween the parties."9
TSL first argued that its shrinkwrap license constituted a pro-
posed modification of the contract under section 2-209 of the UCCW
52. See id.
53. See id. at 763-64.
54. Id. at 764 (alteration in original).
55. See id.
56. Id. at 763.
57. See id. at 764-65.
58. Id. at 764.
59. See id-
60. See id.
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TSL maintained that ARS had "assented"61 to this modification by
opening the software after it had a chance to review the license."
The court, however, rejected this argument, emphasizing that "assent
must be express and cannot be inferred merely from a party's con-
duct in continuing with the agreement."" In short, the court found
that while the shrinkwrap license may have been a proposed modifi-
cation under section 2-209, ARS did not assent to it; consequently, it
did not become part of the agreement.64
Next, TSL argued that its shipping of the software with a shrink-
wrap license constituted a "conditional acceptance" of ARS's offer to
purchase.6 Specifically, TSL claimed that its acceptance was condi-
tioned upon ARS accepting the terms of the license included with the
shipment.' The court disagreed, however.6 It found that TSL en-
tered into a contract with ARS "[b]y agreeing to ship the goods to
ARS, or, at the latest, by shipping the goods."' Since a contract had
already been formed by the time ARS received the software and the
shrinkwrap license, the license could not have constituted a condi-
tional acceptance, regardless of its terms.
Lastly, as it did in Step-Saver, TSL proposed the application of
section 2-207 and argued that its warranty disclaimer provisions were
part of the agreement since they were not material. Once again, the
court was not impressed, stating simply that "[t]he Step-Saver court
61. "Assent" is defined as "[c]ompliance; approval of something done; a dec-
laration of willingness to do something in compliance with a request; acquies-
cence; agreement. To approve, ratify and confirm. It implies a conscious ap-
proval of facts actually known, as distinguished from mere neglect to ascertain
facts. Sometimes it is equivalent to 'authorize."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
115 (6th ed. 1990).
62. See Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 764.
63. Id. Note that UCC section 2-209 contains no specific "assent" require-
ment for a modification to be valid. See U.C.C. § 2-209. The court, referring to
Step-Saver, stated that "TSL has cited no authority to contradict this interpreta-
tion of section 2-209 and this court concludes that the Third Circuit correctly de-
cided the issue." Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 764. Recall, however, that the
Step-Saver court applied section 2-207, not section 2-209. See supra notes 34-48
and accompanying text. The Step-Saver court gave little attention to section 2-
209 but did indicate a requirement of assent. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98 ("[A]
writing will be... a binding modification... only if the parties so intend.").
64. See Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 764.
65. See id. at 764-65.
66. See id.
67. See id.
6& Id. at 765.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 766.
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rejected this exact argument and so [do we].'
In both cases under consideration above, the timing of contract
formation played a pivotal role. In Step-Saver the court determined
that the parties' conduct formed a contract and that the buyer did not
have an opportunity to read the license until after the contract was
formed.7 Consequently, the court held that the terms of the license
were not part of the agreement.s Similarly, with the subsequent pur-
chases in Arizona Retail, the court held that the terms in the license
were not part of the agreement since the formation of the contract
had already occurred before the buyer could read them.74 As for the
initial purchase, however, the court concluded that the license was
part of the agreement because the buyer did have an opportunity to
read it before contract formation.75 For both courts, the controlling
issue was whether the buyer had an opportunity to read the license
before contract formation.
III. PROCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG
A. The Software Purchase
ProCD is a producer of computer software programs." It has
spent millions of dollars creating Select Phone, a national directory of
residential and business listings placed on CD-ROM discs.' The
program is sold in a box which contains both the discs and a "Single
User License Agreement." 7 The box is sealed in cellophane, which
prevents the buyer from reading the license prior to purchasing the
software.79
In creating its software, ProCD identified two distinct groups of
potential Select Phone users." The first group, personal users, "could
71. Id.
72. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 98.
73. See id at 105.
74. See Arizona Retail, 831 F. Supp. at 764-66.
75. See id. at 763-64.
76. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996),
rev'd, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
77. See id. The listings are gathered from telephone books and include full
names, street addresses, telephone numbers, and zip codes. See id A search
program, which enables the user to find desired listings by typing in search
words, is included with the software. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d
1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
78. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
79. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
80. See id
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use the database as a substitute for calling long distance information,
or as a way to look up old friends who have moved to unknown
towns, or just as an electronic substitute for the local phone book."81
The second group, commercial users, such as manufacturers and re-
tailers, who "pay high prices to specialized information intermediar-
ies for such mailing lists," could use the information "to compile lists
of potential customers."'
In determining the marketing strategy for its software, ProCD
recognized that its product would be "much more valuable to some
users than to others." As a result, ProCD decided to sell its soft-
ware to personal users at a price lower than that charged to commer-
cial users.' The "commercial version" and "personal version" of the
software were essentially identical in substance; however, the per-
sonal version's license agreement prohibited the user from using the
software for commercial purposes."
After purchasing the personal version of the software from a re-
tailer, Matthew Zeidenberg ignored ProCD's prohibition against
commercial use. Zeidenberg, though aware of the license and its
terms," began using the product for commercial purposes despite the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id ProCD sold its personal version of Select Phone for approxi-
mately $150. See id. The commercial version sold for considerably more. See id.
The act of selling an identical product at different prices to different
classes of consumers is known as "price discrimination." See id. In his opinion,
Judge Easterbrook explained the necessity of price discrimination as it related to
ProCD's product:
If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a
single price-that is, if it could not charge more to commercial users that
to the general public-it would have to raise the price substantially over
$150. The ensuing reduction in sales would harm consumers who value
the information at, say, $200. They get consumer surplus of $50 under
the current arrangement but would cease to buy if the price rose sub-
stantially. If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer seg-
ment of the market the only way to make a profit turned out to be a
price attractive to commercial users alone, then all consumers would
ose out-and so would the commercial clients, who would have to pay
more for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution
toward costs from the consumer market.
Id.
85. See id. at 1450.
86. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
87. See id. The district court, noting both the user guide in which the license
was printed and the computer screens which reminded the user of the license,
found that Zeidenberg was aware of the license at the time he used the software
and that he disregarded it because he "did not believe the license to be binding."
[Vol. 31:325
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prohibition in the license." ProCD demanded that Zeidenberg cease
all commercial use of the software, but Zeidenberg refused." To en-
force its license and prevent Zeidenberg from continuing his com-
mercial endeavors, ProCD filed suit and sought a preliminary injunc-
tion.9'
B. In the District Court
In the district court, Judge Crabb first confirmed that ProCD's
software was a "good"91 and that the UCC therefore applied to the
transaction.' She then. discussed three possible applications of the
UCC to the transaction.
3
Judge Crabb first applied UCC section 2-206 to the transaction
and noted that this section "sets forth basic notions of offer and ac-
ceptance" in sales contracts.9 In applying section 2-206, Judge Crabb
found that ProCD had made an offer to sell its software by placing
the software on the retailer's shelf.95 Furthermore, she determined
that Zeidenberg accepted the offer when he took the software to the
counter and purchased it.9" In sum, she concluded that a contract was
formed at the time of purchase.90
Id.
88. See id. Zeidenberg provided the information to third parties over the In-
ternet. See id. This frustrated ProCD's price discrimination scheme because
commercial users, who would otherwise have to purchase the commercial version
of the software, could now get it from Zeidenberg for less. See ProCD, 86 F.3d
at 1450 ("[Zeidenberg] makes the database available on the Internet to anyone
willing to pay [his] price-which, needless to say, is less than ProCD charges its
commercial customers.").
89. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
90. See id. at 645-46.
91. Under the UCC, goods are "all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale
other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities
(Article 8) and things in action." U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1995).
92. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 650-51. The UCC only applies to
"transactions in goods." U.C.C. § 2-102. For a discussion on the applicability of
the UCC to software sales, see generally Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer
Software As a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of
the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REv. 129 (1985) (discussing whether software is
a "good" under the UCC).
93. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651-55.
94. Id. at 651. Section 2-206 provides that "[u]nless otherwise unambiguously
indicated by the language or circumstances,... an offer to make a contract shall
be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reason-
able in the circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a).
95. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651-52.
96. See id. at 652.
97. See id
November 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ProCD argued that Zeidenberg's acceptance was "contingent
upon [his] rights of inspection, rejection or revocation.""8 Judge
Crabb rejected this argument and confirmed that these rights do not
apply in the context of contract formation.' Instead, they work to
ensure that "buyers will not be saddled with goods that have been
damaged or are otherwise unsatisfactory upon arrival, but [they do]
not create a right to inspect additional written contractual terms."
M
The court concluded that the additional terms of ProCD's license
would be more appropriately evaluated under sections 2-207 and 2-
209.101
In alternatively applying sections 2-207 and 2-209, the court, as
did the courts in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology'
1
and Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,O' found that a
contract had formed before the buyer was given opportunity to re-
view the license."4 Unlike the previous courts, however, Judge Crabb
felt it was "unnecessary to consider in detail the distinctions between
[sections] 2-207 and 2-209 because the terms of the user agreement
are not binding on defendants regardless which section is applied." ' 5
Like the court in Arizona Retail, Judge Crabb determined that since
Zeidenberg did not give "express assent,"1°6 the terms of the license
did not modify the contract under section 2-209." With regard to
section 2-207, Judge Crabb noted that Step-Saver was different be-
cause that case involved a transaction between two merchants, rather
than one between a consumer and a merchant1 w She found that since
the terms of the license in Step-Saver were not valid against the mer-
chant, "it is improbable to think that the drafters wanted consumers
to be held to additional proposed terms in situations in which mer-
chants were given protection."' ' In summary, if additional terms are
9& IL
99. See id.
100. Id. (emphasis added).
101. See id.
102. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
103. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
104. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. See id
10& Id.
109. Id- Article 2 of the UCC "assumes that transactions between profession-
als in a given field require special and clear rules which may not apply to a casual
or inexperienced seller or buyer. It thus adopts a policy of expressly stating rules
applicable 'between merchants' and 'as against a merchant', wherever they are
needed .... ." U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
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not valid against a merchant, they certainly are not valid against an
individual consumer.
C. In the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
In reversing the district court's decision, Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held that
shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms violate a rule
of positive law or are unconscionable.11 For Judge Easterbrook, it
did not matter that Zeidenberg was unable to see the license before
purchasing the software.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that both the common law of
contracts and the UCC sanction the sequence of money now, terms
later."' The court first discussed the commonality and desirability of
non-UCC transactions in which "money precedes the communication
of detailed terms."'" For example, the court discussed the purchase
of insurance where typically the buyer and agent discuss only the es-
sential terms-amount of coverage, number of years, and premium
amount-of the contract when payment is made."3 Only later does
the insured receive a policy which outlines other detailed terms."
The court also discussed the purchase of airline and concert tickets. s
In both instances, the buyer often purchases the ticket over the
phone."' Only later does the buyer get an opportunity to read the
terms that accompany the use of the ticket.117 Finally, the court dis-
cussed software transactions themselves and noted the increasing
amount of transactions that take place electronically, without boxes
and accompanying documents.' The court asserted that to hold con-
tractual terms invalid in transactions like these simply because they
were delivered to the purchaser after the purchase "would drive
prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horse-and-
buggy age."" 9
Like courts before it, the Seventh Circuit applied the UCC to the
transaction; however, it provided a dramatically different analysis.
110. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
111. See idU at 1450-53.
112. Id. at 1451.
113. See id.
114. See id
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1451-52.
119. Id. at 1452.
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The court asserted that the proper starting point for the analysis was
section 2-204(1), which provides that "[a] contract for sale of goods
may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a con-
tract."1 The court found that ProCD, as master of the offer, had the
power to limit the manner of acceptance of its offer to particular
conduct." Furthermore, the court concluded that ProCD had effec-
tively prevented contract formation until the time Zeidenberg had an
opportunity to take the software home and read the license.I" The
Seventh Circuit, unlike prior courts, found that contract formation
did not take place at time of purchase.ln Instead, it found that a con-
tract was formed some time after the buyer was given an opportunity
to read the license.U This allowed the court to conclude that the
terms of the license were part of the agreement since Zeidenberg was
aware of the terms prior to contract formation."
IV. TBE PROBLEM WiTH PROCD, INC. V. ZEIDENBERG
A. A Contract Was Formed When Zeidenberg Purchased the Software
As in earlier cases, the timing of contract formation played a
central role in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg1 6 Whereas prior decisions
found that contract formation occurred before the buyer was given
an opportunity to read the shrinkwrap license," the Seventh Circuit
concluded that a contract was not formed until after the buyer was
given an opportunity to read the license1 2 This deferral of contract
formation, however, is wholly inconsistent not only with the purpose
120. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-204 (1995) (discussing contract formation in gen-
eral).
121. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The court confirmed that although "a con-
tract can be, and often is, formed simply by paying the price and walking out of
the store, the UCC permits contracts to be formed in other ways." Id.
122. See id at 1450-52.
123. See id. at 1452.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1452-53.
126. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
127. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991) (finding that contract formation occurred when the buyer ordered and
seller shipped the product); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (concluding that the purchase of software over the counter formed a
contract); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (finding that a contract formed when the buyer ordered the software
by telephone, and the seller shipped it).
128. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
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of the UCC, but also with its plain language.
The UCC was designed to make contracts easier to form.n9
Specifically, its aim was to eliminate the often harsh and rigid rules of
the common law which "ignored the modem realities of com-
merce."m° For example, under the common law rule, an acceptance
has to "mirror" an offer.Y' Thus, if the offeror offers to sell an auto-
mobile and deliver it in 10 days, the offeree has no choice but to ac-
cept the offer as stated by the offeror. If the offeree states, "I accept
your offer and will expect delivery in 5 days," no contract results; in-
stead, the offeree has made a counter-offer 2 Under the UCC, how-
ever, a contract would result. The offeree's response would be con-
sidered an acceptance, and the delivery term would be considered a
proposal for addition to the contract.3
Similarly, the form and manner of acceptance have been signifi-
cantly liberalized as well. Under the common law rule, the form and
manner of acceptance have to be identical to that of the offer.'
Thus, if a buyer sends a written offer to buy fifty bushels of grain, the
seller cannot accept the offer by shipping the grain. Instead, the
129. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-2, at 4 (4th ed. 1995).
130. Id. § 1-3, at 7.
131. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 2-21, at 101-02 (3d ed. 1987). This is known as the "mirror image" rule.
See id. "It is a basic principle of contract law that, in order to create a contract,
an acceptance must be unconditional, identical to the offer, and must not modify,
delete or introduce any new terms into the offer." Gyurkey v. Babler, 651 P.2d
928, 931 (Idaho 1982). "Rigid application of the rule has proved detrimental to
commerce, particularly since business today is largely done through the mails on
printed forms and the buyer's and seller's forms frequently clash as to ancillary
terms of the transaction." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, § 2-21, at 102; see also
Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319 (N.M. 1993) (finding
that the drafters of the UCC intended to change the common law "mirror image"
rule).
132. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 131, § 2-21, at 101.
133. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1)-(2) (1995) & cmt. 1.
134. See Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978) ("At common law, in
order to prove the existence of a contract, the proponent must adduce credible
evidence that an offer was made which was then accepted by a communication in
the same medium purporting to accept it in the exact terms of the offer."); see
also John E. Murray, Jr., Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 785, 785-86 (1968) ("[I]f the offeror requires a promise, the
only manner of acceptance is by promise, and, if the offeror requires an act, the
only manner of acceptance is by performance."); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra
note 131, § 2-17, at 81 ("Clearly the offeree, as a reasonable man, should under-
stand that the offeror expects to know that the offeree has made the requested
return promise so that he may guide his conduct accordingly.").
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seller has to communicate an acceptance to the buyer, which thereby
cuts off the buyer's power to revoke. 5 The UCC eliminates this re-
quirement and allows an offeree to accept an offer "in any manner
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances."' ' 6 The UCC
restricts the ability of an offeree to accept in any manner reasonable
only if the seller "unambiguously" specifies a manner of accep-
tance.w
The ProCD court did not dispute that ProCD made an offer by
placing its software on the retailer's shelf?8 The court felt, however,
that the offer precluded Zeidenberg from accepting it by simply
making the purchase. The court stated that "ProCD proposed a
contract that a buyer would accept by using the software after having
an opportunity to read the license at leisure." ' The court, however,
did not state exactly how ProCD made this proposal. It simply con-
cluded that "ProCD proposed such a different way."'41
The court's conclusion is at odds with both the plain language of
the UCC and its intent to liberalize the common law rules of contract
formation. Section 2-206 provides that absent specification from the
offeror, an offeree can accept an offer in any reasonable manner."'
The official comment further provides that "[a]ny reasonable manner
of acceptance is intended to be regarded as available unless the of-
feror has made quite clear that it will not be acceptable."'' ProCD
was anything but clear. It simply placed a box of software on the
shelf for purchase. Nothing on the box instructed Zeidenberg to take
the box home, review a license, and then determine whether he was
still interested in the software. Certainly, ProCD could have clearly
manifested its intention to preclude contract formation until a later
time; but it did not do so here. Hence, the court incorrectly deter-
mined that no contract was formed at the time of purchase.
135. See CALAMARI & PERiLLO, supra note 131, § 2-20(d), at 96 ("A revocable
offer may be revoked at any time prior to effective acceptance by the offeree.").
136. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a).
137. Id. § 2-206(1).
138. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
139. See id at 1452.
140. IM.
141. Id
142 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a).
143. Id. § 2-206 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
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B. The UCC Does Not Sanction "Money Now, Terms Later"
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg'" the court concluded that the
terms of the shrinkwrap license were enforceable against Zeidenberg
even though he was not aware of them at the time he purchased the
software.14 The court provided the following hypothetical to illus-
trate its conclusion: "Someone who wants to buy a radio set visits a
store, pays, and walks out with a box. Inside the box is a leaflet con-
taining some terms, the most important of which usually is the war-
ranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home."'" 1 In support of
their enforceability, the court stated that as "far as [it was] aware, no
state disregards warranties furnished with consumer products."' 47
Contrary to the proposition set forth in ProCD, courts consis-
tently require disclosure of terms, especially warranty disclaimers,
prior to consummation of a sale. In Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,'48
also a Seventh Circuit case, the court considered the enforceability of
warranty disclaimers located in booklets that were placed in the glove
boxes of the seller's trucks. 49 Though the court ultimately enforced
the disclaimers against the buyer based on the parties' long-standing
relationship, the court clearly agreed with the buyer that "a seller
may not 'spring' a warranty disclaimer on a customer after a sale has
been consummated." 15°
In another case involving an automobile sale, a court considered
the enforceability of warranty disclaimers placed inside the owner's
144. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
145. See id. at 1452-53. The court noted that the outside of the software box
contained a statement that indicated that the transaction was "subject to a li-
cense." Id at 1450. The court found that Zeidenberg agreed to this term at the
time of purchase because of its location on the outside of the box, and that the
sales transaction operated to incorporate the terms of the license located inside
the box. See id. It is important to note, however, that the holding of the case did
not require this language or any other type of notice for the terms of an enclosed
shrinkwrap license to be enforceable. See id. at 1449. In addition, after the deci-
sion in ProCD, Judge Easterbrook delivered another Seventh Circuit decision
confirming the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses, regardless of whether the
buyer had notice of a license at the time of purchase. See Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997). In Hill, Judge Easterbrook conceded
that "ProCD's software displayed a notice that additional terms were within,
while the box containing Gateway's computer did not," but found this difference
to be "functional, not legal." Id at 1150.
146. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
147. Id.
148. 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985).
149. See id. at 1087 n.7.
150. Id- at 1086.
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manual. 5' In that case, the buyer did not receive the owner's manual
until after he had purchased the car; but prior to purchase, he signed
an order form that purported to "incorporate by reference" the terms
included in the owner's manual.52 Even with the "incorporation"
term on the order form, the court concluded that "the conditions ap-
pearing in the [owner's] manual, standing alone, would not be bind-
ing, for a 'mere delivery of a printed and unexecuted form after the
sale had been consummated would not bind the purchaser."'
15 3
Courts in other jurisdictions also have consistently invalidated terms
presented to buyers after purchase.'T
Clearly, the software purchase in ProCD and the subsequent
presentation of the shrinkwrap license, with its significant limitations,
amounted to just the type of situation that prior courts have treated
with disdain. When Zeidenberg purchased the software at the re-
tailer, he knew nothing more than the information presented on the
box-price, software title, subject matter, etc.55 Had the use restric-
tion been on the box, Zeidenberg probably would not have parted
with his money and made the purchase. But this information did not
appear on the box, and he proceeded with his purchase based on the
151. See Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 276 A.2d 807, 809 (Conn. Cir. Ct.
1970).
152. Id. at 811.
153. Id. (quoting Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, 165 A.2d 914, 916
(Md. 1960)).
154. See, e.g., Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman, 437 S.W.2d 784 (Ark.
1969) (holding warranty disclaimer invalid because buyer did not become aware
of it until after purchase price was paid); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt &
Rock Co., 437 S.W.2d 459 (Ark. 1969) (concluding that a warranty disclaimer is
ineffective when attempted at time of delivery rather than before contract was
signed); Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (Ct.
App. 1966) (finding that warranty disclaimers made on or after delivery by
means of language on invoice, receipt, or similar notice are ineffectual when
made after the sale is complete); Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982) (finding that when a seller does not attempt a limitation of rem-
edy until after the contract for sale has been made, even a properly worded limi-
tation is ineffective); Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, 165 A.2d 914
(Md. 1960) (concluding that conditions could not be attached to sales of ma-
chines after they had been delivered and after the sales had been consummated);
Miller v. Andy Burger Motors, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) (finding
dealer warranty ineffective when given to buyer after purchase); Pfizer Genetics,
Inc. v. Williams Management Co., 281 N.W.2d 536 (Neb. 1979) (determining that
disclaimers of warranty made after delivery of goods are ineffective); Gaha v.
Taylor-Johnson Dodge, Inc., 632 P.2d 483 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (finding that a
warranty limiting consequential damages is not enforceable when given to buyer
after purchase).
155. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450-51.
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information available to him at the time.
Sellers must disclose terms before the buyer enters into an
agreement to purchase.1 56 Accordingly, ProCD had a duty to make
Zeidenberg aware of the use limitation before he purchased the soft-
ware. Requiring this disclosure is "both an equitable and logical in-
terpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code."' ProCD did not,
however, make Zeidenberg aware of the limitation until after he had
already made the significant decision to purchase the software. If
ProCD considered the term to be of great importance, it should have
communicated it to Zeidenberg before he parted with his money.
For the courts to allow otherwise is simply inequitable and illogical.
C. The Holding in ProCD Exploits the Consumer
The holding in ProCD exploits the modem consumer. In its
analysis, the Seventh Circuit ignored consumer behavior. The court
concluded that as long as the consumer has "a right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable,"'' 8 the terms of
the license are enforceable. In light of established principles of con-
sumer behavior, however, the right to return the software is practi-
cally meaningless.
Though the study of consumer behavior emphasizes the dynam-
ics of consumer behavior before the sale,'59 much attention and effort
go into the study of postpurchase behavior as well."o After purchas-
ing a product, a consumer may have a variety of reactions. 6' Some
156. See Hahn, 434 N.E.2d at 948.
157. Pfizer Genetics, 281 N.W.2d at 539.
158. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
159. See C. GLENN WALTERS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: THEORY AND
PRACrICE 159 (3d ed. 1978). The purchase process is intricate and involves many
steps before a sale is actually consummated. See id. Before a sale, the consumer
must recognize a particular need, gather information, and choose among alterna-
fives. See id. Only after this can the consumer make a decision to purchase. See
id.
160. See JAMES F. ENGEL ET AL., CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 532-44 (2d ed. 1973).
It is a common misperception that the study of consumer behavior focuses only
on prepurchase influences. See i. The study of consumer behavior is very im-
portant for marketers charged with making sure that the customer buys a particu-
lar product again. See id. Those who must understand consumer behavior real-
ize that "[t]he consumer decision process is not over when the final [purchase] is
made." TERELL G. WILLIAMS, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR: FUNDAMENTALS AND
STRATEGIES 45 (1981).
161. See DOUGLAS W. MELLOT, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR 432 (1983). The common post-decision question that consumers have
is, "Did I make the best purchase?" Id.
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consumers may be extremely happy with their purchases and become
loyal customers to a particular brand.62 For a variety of reasons,
however, others may not be pleased with their purchases.'" Con-
sumer researchers focus on these dissatisfied buyers because they
pose the highest risk of not repurchasing a particular product.'"
Researchers have found that many consumers experience ten-
sion or discomfort after purchasing a product.' This discomfort,
commonly referred to as "postdecision dissonance,"'"6 results from a
consumer's inconsistent feelings about a purchase.' 67 For example,
consumers who believe that they made the best deal with their pur-
chases may experience postdecision dissonance when later reading an
advertisement for the same product at a lower price. The belief that
the best bargain has been made clashes with the advertisement, which
shows a better deal.
The prototypical ProCD purchase presents fertile ground for the
creation of postdecision dissonance. The software purchaser who is
lulled into buying the product by a fancy box that describes what the
software can do is bound to experience conflict when later reading a
shrinkwrap license that disclaims warranties or limits usage of the
software to particular purposes. According to the Seventh Circuit,
this is not a problem because the buyer will simply return the soft-
ware, right? Wrong.
Consumer behavior researchers have established that consumers
who experience postdecision dissonance will naturally strive to re-
lieve this discomfort.'" Though returning a product is clearly one
way to relieve dissonance, consumers are not likely to do this because
it requires them to admit that a mistake has been made.'69 One
author noted that
American customers might shop carefully, but they rarely
162. See ENGELETAL., supra note 160, at 532.
163. See WILLIAMS, supra note 160, at 46.
164. See id.
165. See ENGEL ET AL., supra note 160, at 536.
166. 1d.
167. See id.
168. See MELLOT, JR., supra note 161, at 431 ("Because dissonance is uncom-
fortable, the individual will be motivated by the resulting tension to reduce or
eliminate the dissonance."); see also WILLIAM L. WILKIE, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
620 (2d ed. 1990) ("And, since dissonance produces unpleasant feelings, we'll be
motivated to act to reduce the amount of dissonance we are experiencing.").
169. See ENGEL Er AL., supra note 160, at 535 ("[T]he average person is reluc-
tant to admit that he has made a mistake once funds have been committed to an
alternative.").
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retract a deal after the sale has been closed. This gives the
seller an unfair advantage within our cultural context be-
cause the customer doesn't get the bad news about the li-
cense until after comparison shopping is complete and the
purchase is made.7
Instead, consumers are more likely to undergo an attitude change
about their decisions and rationalize that the best decision has in fact
been made despite the new information. Following this attitude
change, consumers will then use the product and further attempt to
reconcile any remaining negative feelings. 2
The revelations of the dissonance reduction process illuminate
the weakness of the ProCD decision. The result is a windfall for
software producers. Not only do they get to advertise without having
to risk turning away the buyer with unfavorable terms, but also they
get to retain the sale, even if the buyer is not happy with the terms of
the agreement.7 3
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Notice to the Buyer That the Sale Does Not Create a Contract
According to the Seventh Circuit in ProCD, "[a] buyer may ac-
cept [a contract] by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat
170. Cem Kaner, Proposed Article 2B: Problems from the Customer's View,
UCC BuLL., Feb. 1997, at 1, 4. "[I]t is unrealistic to expect customers to return
products under these circumstances, even if the terms are entirely unreasonable."
Id. at 3.
171. See id.
172. See MELLOT, JR., supra note 161, at 432.
173. The drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws is currently drafting Article 2B, which will apply to shrink-
wrap licenses. Under Article 2B, a shrinkwrap license will be enforceable if the
buyer agrees, or manifests assent, to the license. See U.C.C. § 2B-208(a)
(Discussion Draft Sept. 25,1997). A party manifests assent when, after having an
opportunity to review the license, it (1) authenticates the license or engages in
other affirmative conduct or operations that the license conspicuously provides
or the circumstances clearly indicate will constitute acceptance of the license; and
(2) has an opportunity to decline to authenticate the license or engage in the
conduct. See id. § 2B-112(a). The draft further provides that when a license can-
not be reviewed until after the sale, the buyer does not have the requisite oppor-
tunity for review unless the buyer has a right to a full refund if the license is un-
acceptable. Although requiring a refund right is a step in the right direction, it
does not alleviate the burden of returning the product. More importantly, it fails
to consider the tendency of American consumers to retain unsatisfactory prod-
ucts-especially where the dissatisfaction is not with the product itself, but with
terms found in an accompanying agreement.
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as acceptance. ' 74 The court found that ProCD "proposed a contract
that a buyer would accept by using the software after having an op-
portunity to read the license at leisure." ' In addition, the court
found that Zeidenberg agreed to this proposal "without protest."''
The court did not, however, state exactly how ProCD made this pro-
posal to Zeidenberg77
Software vendors who wish to defer contract formation until af-
ter a buyer has had an opportunity to review an enclosed license
should indicate this in a prominent position on the software box. The
statement could be as simple as the following:
Purchase of this software does not create a contract between
the buyer and the manufacturer. Acceptance of our offer to
sell you the software can only occur after you agree to the
terms printed on the enclosed envelope that contains the
software disk. Opening the envelope signifies your agree-
ment to the terms.
Requiring such a statement not only effectively defers contract
formation under the UCC,7's but also communicates to the buyer that
the purchase is not the end of the product evaluation process. Fur-
thermore, the burden to the vendor in placing this statement on the
software box is slight. A review of software boxes reveals that such a
statement would fit quite easily without displacing other valuable in-
formation.
174. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
175. Id.
176. ld.
177. See id The court of appeals found that "[e]very box containing its con-
sumer product declares that the software comes with restrictions stated in an en-
closed license." Id. at 1450. But see ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,
645 (W.D. Wis. 1996), in which the district court found that the box merely"mentions the [license] in one place in small print." Regardless of the nature of
the statement on the box, the court of appeals did not assert that this was the ba-
sis of ProCD's proposal to defer contract formation until after Zeidenberg was
able to read the license. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452.
178. See supra Part IV.A. Recall that section 2-206 allows a contract to be ac-
cepted "in any manner and by any medium reasonable" unless otherwise
"unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances." U.C.C. § 2-206
(1995). The official comment to that section further provides that "[a]ny reason-
able manner of acceptance is intended to be regarded as available unless the of-
feror has made it quite clear that it will not be acceptable." Id. § 2-206 cmt. 1
(emphasis added).
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B. Notice to the Buyer of Particular Terms
The Seventh Circuit apparently believed that Zeidenberg was
given proper notice of the terms inside the box. Judge Easterbrook
found that "[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside... may be a
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike."79 But
just what notice did Zeidenberg really have? The software box in
ProCD stated "that the software comes with restrictions stated in an
enclosed license.""'° The box did not state that the software could not
be used for commercial purposes.' For the Seventh Circuit, this
constituted notice.
Informing consumers that a product is "subject to a license" does
not sufficiently communicate that the transaction may involve terms
that, if known, would cause them not to purchase the product. The
179. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). It is inter-
esting that in support of this proposition, Judge Easterbrook cited the comment
to section 211 of the Restatement of Contracts. See id. The comment provides
that "[s]tandardization of agreements serves many of the same functions as stan-
dardization of goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass produc-
tion and distribution. Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class
of transactions rather than to details of individual transactions." RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACrS § 211 cmt. a (1981).
Judge Easterbrook's citation of section 211 here misses the point. It is
true that shrinkwrap licenses have been attacked on the grounds that as standard
form contracts, they are contracts of adhesion. See Gomulkiewicz & Williamson,
supra note 23, at 343; see also JOHN T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAw § 2.16A, at 88-89 (1996) ("[Shrinkwrap licenses are] essentially adhe-
sive."). Contracts of adhesion raise two problems. First, because they are pre-
printed forms, there is no negotiation between the parties. See SOMA, supra, §
2.16A, at 89. A consumer has the option of taking the terms, or leaving them.
Second, people often fail to read standard form contracts. See CALAMARI &
PERILLO, supra note 131, § 9-44, at 418. The general rule is that contracting par-
ties have a duty to read the contract. See id. § 9-42, at 410. Failure to do so is not
a valid defense. See id. However, "[tjhere has been a tendency, particularly in
recent years, to treat contracts of adhesion or standard form contracts differently
from other contracts." IL § 9-44, at 418. With this type of contract, courts are
more willing to excise terms in the name of fairness. See id. § 9-44, at 418-24.
The license in ProCD is undoubtedly subject to criticism because of its
adhesive quality. But there is a much greater problem. In ProCD, the consumer
did not neglect to read the contract; he was prevented from doing so because it
was in a sealed box. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450. With other standard form con-
tracts, the problem is not that people are prevented from reading them; they
simply neglect to do so. It is far different to say that a contract is objectionable
because people neglect to read it than to say it is objectionable because people
are unable to read it.
180. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450. The district court noted that the "box mentions
the agreement in one place in small print." ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
181. See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645.
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facts in ProCD prove this point. Buyers who purchase ProCD's soft-
ware for use in a commercial application are not going to have any
idea that the software cannot be used for this purpose. Instead, they
will buy the software, only to find out later that they will have to re-
turn it or use it in violation of the license. This makes no sense, es-
pecially because the software vendor can prevent this hardship with
minimal burden.
The Seventh Circuit maintained that "[v]endors can put the en-
tire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by using micro-
scopic type, removing other information that buyers might find more
useful (such as what the software does, and on which computers it
works), or both."" This, however, is not what needs to be done to
give consumers notice of terms that might be materially relevant to
their intended plans for the software.
In the same amount of text needed to inform prospective users
that the transaction was subject to a license, ProCD could have in-
formed buyers that the software was for personal use only. This is all
that would have been required. A consumer that sees this on a box
can hardly claim ignorance later.
Disclaimers of warranties work the same way. A software ven-
dor that wishes to disclaim warranties or limit remedies need not put
the entire language of the terms on the box. Instead, a phrase such as
"significant disclaimer of warranties and limitation of remedies ap-
plies to this transaction" would be sufficient to let consumers know
that before buying the product, they should consider whether they
are covered should use of the software result in a loss. Again, though
consumers may not like this term-especially if a loss does in fact re-
sult-they cannot complain that they were not aware of it up front.
This is all that fairness demands.
The Seventh Circuit was correct to recognize that buyers might
find software's attributes "more useful" than license terms. Cer-
tainly, people are more interested in what a piece of software can do
for them as opposed to what it cannot. This fact, however, does not
obviate the need to let buyers know about contractual limitations at
the time of purchase. It does not make sense to say that we should
postpone telling buyers about the terms of a contract simply because
they do not want to be troubled with it at the time of purchase. It
makes even less sense when one considers that a software vendor can
effectively inform the consumer of important terms with no more
182- ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
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burden than letting them know the transaction is subject to a license.
C. An Opportunity to Review
Giving the consumer notice of significant license terms on the
box does not mean that a consumer should not have an opportunity
to review a license prior to making the purchase. In fact, giving no-
tice of terms to a buyer may increase the need to have the license
available for review before the sale is consummated.
Software vendors, in cooperation with retailers, can give buyers
the opportunity to review shrinkwrap licenses before purchase.
Software vendors need only send a copy of the license to the retailer.
The retailer could then compile the licenses in a binder. Software
consumers wishing to review a particular license could then find the
license in the binder and review it in greater detail.
Making the licenses available for review will reduce the inequity
caused by consumers having to return software with undesirable
terms. It is true that not every software consumer will need to see
the entire license before purchasing the product. There are those,
however, who may want to use software for a particular purpose,
namely commercial applications. In these situations, a review of the
license may be necessary. By reviewing the license before purchase,
buyers can avoid the hardship of returning the software by making an
informed decision before walking out of the store.
VI. CONCLUSION
Transactional efficiency is necessary in an increasingly techno-
logical world, but it should not come at the cost of fairness. The
opinion in ProCD was correct to recognize that shrinkwrap licenses
can play an important role in making software transactions more ef-
ficient; however, in not providing any meaningful guidance for their
use, it left the door open for abuse.
The use of shrinkwrap licenses can be a "win-win" situation for
both the software producer and consumer. Software producers can
make shrinkwrap transactions fair with minimal burden. By putting a
few extra lines of text on the box and sending a copy of the license to
the retailer, they can be confident that their licenses will not be ren-
dered unenforceable."' In addition, consumers will know what they
are getting up front, without uncertainty or the potential
183. Established concepts of contract law would still apply. Thus, a court
could still excise terms based on unconscionability.
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inconvenience of having to return desirable software with undesir-
able contract terms.
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